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Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. By Susan Rose-Ackerman.
New York: Academic Press, 1978. Pp. xii, 258. $16.95.
Reviewed by Gary J. Millert
There are several reasons for economists' growing interest in non-
market-especially political-behavior. First, the world of classical
microeconomics, with its atomistic actors competing in free markets, is
an increasingly unrealistic model of economic reality, if not an out-
right anachronism. Second, the normative challenge of "market failure"
forces economists to turn their attention to governmental institutions:
even if one could abolish governmental intervention in the market-
place, it would not be desirable ("efficient") to do so in the presence of
externalities, public goods, or monopolies. Third, economic assump-
tions and methods have been found applicable and useful outside of
the market. Indeed, the work of Arrow,' Downs, 2 Niskanen, 3 and other
economists has defined much of the agenda for political science in
recent decades.
Rose-Ackerman's recent book is evidence that the second generation
of economic analyses will not be less productive of political insights
than the first. Her volume does not, I believe, inaugurate a whole new
literature in political science, as Arrow inaugurated the literature of
social choice and Downs the field of spatial modeling. Yet it is the
most complete effort I know of to date to consolidate and extend the
accumulated knowledge of political economy by bringing that knowl-
edge to bear on a new subject matter. Her discussion of political cor-
ruption demonstrates remarkable understanding of the entire range of
approaches to political economy, from spatial modeling to operations
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology.
1. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
2. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
3. W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
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research. At the same time, she includes a thoughtful analysis of a key
question that has not been answered in past decades: what are the
limits of usefulness of political economic analysis?
I. The Agency Relationship
The basic unit of analysis in Rose-Ackerman's book is a relationship
that is of interest in economics, political science, and law. This rela-
tionship is one in which one actor (the principal) purchases the right
to direct another actor (the agent) to act in the principal's interest.
This relationship can be found in the marketplace, where, for in-
stance, an agent may put together a portfolio of investments for his or
her principal. Although it is not generally recognized, the agency
relationship is fundamental in political science. The legislator may be
thought of as an agent for a plural principal (the constituency), while
the agency head is an agent for another plural principal, the legislature.
Both these kinds of agency relationships are examined in the first half
of Rose-Ackerman's book. A third agency relationship is found within
the hierarchical bureaucratic agency, in which each subordinate acts
as an agent for his or her superior. The behavior of subordinate
bureaucrats is examined in the latter part of Corruption.4
As the title suggests, one of the most salient features of the agency
relationship is its fragility. The agent has his or her own interests,
which do not disappear when the principal purchases the agent's time.
For instance, an assembly-line worker in an auto plant may sabotage
the work flow. If he does so out of boredom or revenge or other purely
self-interested motivation, this could be called "noncompliance." On
the other hand, if the auto worker sabotages the work because of a
bribe from a third actor, this is "corruption" and is the primary focus
of Rose-Ackerman's analysis. Can political institutions be organized in
such a way that it is in no agent's self-interest to take a bribe? If so,
how? If not, what does this say about the role of economic analysis of
political institutions?
II. Legislators
The argument proceeds in the classic economic manner. Each chapter
states a set of assumptions; the implications of the assumptions are
derived, and then compared with real-world behavior in settings in
which the assumptions apply. Succeeding chapters develop more com-
plex sets of assumptions.
4. S. ROsE-AcKERMAN, CORRUPTION (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
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The first, bare-bones model assumes a legislature composed of poli-
ticians elected from single-member districts. These politicians are in-
terested in reelection and in income. Voters judge incumbents on
voting records and candidates on voting platforms. Interest groups can
influence politicians' voting income by means of bribes, but bribes in-
fluence the politician's voting record and thus may affect chances of
reelection. If politicians have perfect knowledge of their constituents'
preferences, Rose-Ackerman concludes that they will not budge from a
winning platform for the sake of a bribe. But if they have imperfect
knowledge of preferences, and hence of the winning platform, they
may allow their voting record to be influenced by bribes, with higher
bribes necessary in close elections. Electoral competition is thus an im-
perfect institutional hedge against corruption.
The analysis of interest groups in this section concludes that the
group's relative size, resource base, geographical dispersion, and degree
of organization all affect the influence of the interest group on policy
outcomes. Although many of these observations can also be found in
Mancur Olson's study of interest groups,5 some of Rose-Ackerman's
demonstrations are intriguing. For instance, although an organized
minority may bribe its way to a legislative majority in many cases, it
may not attempt to do so if the majority position is also organized to
counter-bribe. By depriving the minority of a "winning strategy," the
organized majority acts as an effective guard against corruption.
By allowing voter ignorance and legislative organization into the as-
sumption set, Rose-Ackerman derives still more interesting implica-
tions. As she correctly points out, interest groups do not undertake to
bribe entire legislatures. The organization of a legislature by party
and committee places certain individuals in positions to play key roles
in the passage of important legislation. Opportunities for corruption
will be focused at these locations. Indeed, if legislators are organized
into political parties, corruption may come in the form of parties ex-
torting bribes from interest groups who would not otherwise be
motivated to engage in corruption; the rational response may be for
interest groups to refuse to organize, in order to limit their vulner-
ability to extortion.
The possibility of voter ignorance and apathy changes the ballgame
remarkably. Politicians can then use bribe money not only for personal
enrichment, but also to induce apathetic citizens to vote or to convince
the uninformed voter that the politician has made the right policy
decisions and deserves to be reelected. As Rose-Ackerman might have
5. M. OLSON, THE LoGIc OF COLLECIVE AcTIoN (1965).
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stressed, the politician's use of selective incentives to get voter support
fundamentally changes the nature of the agency relationship that is the
starting point of the book's analysis. The voters thus cajoled into sup-
porting the politician are in effect in his employ, and the lines of ac-
countability are reversed. This reversal of the asymmetric agency
relationship has been a central implicit concern of political science
since Michels's study of the Iron Law of Oligarchy;" I would have ap-
preciated a more explicit analysis of the implications of this phe-
nomenon.
III. High-Level Bureaucrats
Rose-Ackerman recognizes three positions that legislatures may take
towards bureaucratic corruption: they may actively attempt to ferret
out corruption; they may collaborate with bureaucrats in corruption;
or they may be passive, preoccupied with reelection issues that they
regard as irrelevant to bureaucratic corruption.
Rose-Ackerman deals largely with the latter two positions. As she
argues, the only return for ferreting out corruption may be publicity,
and there are easier ways for legislators to get publicity. Her relative
neglect of the first possibility leaves her with little to say in this section
about her larger concern with institutional means of making honesty
the self-interested policy. Yet, although legislators as individuals may
find little return in the role of watchdog, the legislature as a whole
may find it worthwhile to hire watchdogs (agents) to perform that func-
tion in their interest.7 The General Accounting Office, for example, is
highly regarded as the Congress's most effective tool in fighting bureau-
cratic corruption. The possibility that the legislature as a whole may
be able to combat corruption effectively, at the same time that legis-
lators as individuals are cooperating with it, leaves me somewhat dis-
satisfied with Rose-Ackerman's later conclusion that institutional safe-
guards against corruption can never be adequate.
The major contribution of the section on high-level bureaucrats is
the exploration of the possibilities for subtle, implicit collusion in cor-
ruption. For instance, if it is understood that bureaucrats will use
agency budgets either to win votes for legislators (e.g., by building
projects and creating jobs in legislators' districts) or to provide personal
favors for legislators (e.g., by flying legislators on junkets), then both
bureaucrats have a shared interest in increasing budget size. But bu-
6. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1949).
7. See Miller, Bureaucratic Compliance as a Game on the Unit Square, 24 PUB. CHOICE
37, 37-52 (1977).
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reaucrats' and legislators' interests may conflict with regard to agency
flexibility in agenda and project design. Bureaucrats covet the authority
to initiate projects in different legislative constituencies in order to
increase their bargaining power. Legislators, on the other hand, would
prefer immobile projects for their districts that will ensure a steady
flow of dollars.
IV. Low-Level Bureaucrats
Low-level bureaucrats are defined by Rose-Ackerman as "budget-
takers" in that "each one is such a small part of the total organization
that he or she acts rationally in refusing to take into account the rela-
tionship between individual actions and the legislature's decision on
the size of the agency's budget." In this section, her concern shifts
from the effects of corruption on policy choices to its effects on the
efficient administration of policy.
As in the section on legislatures, Rose-Ackerman begins with a
skeletal model to which she later adds more complex assumptions. She
views the low-level administrator as serving applicants who have to
stand in line to receive the service. The opportunity for corruption lies
in the possibility of a bribe for differential treatment in the queue.
Higher-level administrators or legal officials may be in a position to
punish this corruption, but the model assumes initially that these super-
visors act only upon client complaints.
Waiting in line for service imposes different costs on different in-
dividuals. Some individuals may lose a great deal of money with each
passing minute, while others endure very little cost by waiting. The
honest bureaucrat treats all clients alike, and some economists have
argued that this is inefficient. Those people who are enduring the
highest costs should be served first, and, the argument runs, these costs
are accurately indicated by willingness to pay for preferential treat-
ment. Bribery thus becomes an efficient market solution to the problem
of waiting in line. The bribes encourage corrupt bureaucrats both to
work faster and to serve those most in need first.
Rose-Ackerman's most striking demonstration is to refute this eco-
nomic defense of bribery. Bribes, she argues, do not guarantee effi-
ciency, except perhaps when a system of perfect bribe-price discrimina-
tion is possible and legal, in which case the "officials obtain all of the
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tion, officials may set bribe prices inefficiently. Furthermore, if bribes
are illegal, the bureaucrat allocates services partly on the basis of the
likelihood a client will complain about the bribe. This causes further
inefficient distortions.
More complex bureaucratic services compound the inefficiency of
bribery. Suppose, for instance, that the bureaucrat's job is not to serve
all applicants, but to choose among a group of applicants according to
the government's needs. The opportunity for a bribe then comes from
the bureaucrat's discretion over the awarding of the contract. If the
bureaucrat-buyer is simply one buyer in a competitive market, he has
little opportunity for a bribe. But if the bureaucrat-buyer is in a less
than perfectly competitive (and therefore inefficient) market, there
are monopoly profits to be shared. These profits can be shared in the
form of bribes, but the bribes may increase governmental costs without
guiding the bureaucrat to the most efficient supplier.
Competitiveness among bureaucrats may permit clients to choose
which bureaucrat to approach for service and may decrease the likeli-
hood that bribery will occur, especially if one or more bureaucrats is
personally committed to honesty. But competitiveness does not guaran-
tee the elimination of bribery any more than bribery guarantees effi-
ciency. If bureaucrats have any discretion, as they usually do in a
decentralized bureaucracy, clients may prefer the certainty and speed
of bribing a dishonest official to the uncertainty and delay of reliance
on the honest, conscientious official.
V. The Efficiency of Market-Like Behavior Outside the Market
Welfare economists have demonstrated that individuals' self-inter-
ested choice in competitive markets for private goods leads to efficient
allocations of resources. Because of this, economists often assume that
market-like choice, pricing, and competition may have similarly bene-
ficial effects outside of the normal private market. "Economists typically
take for granted that since the creation of a market increases the in-
dividual's area of choice it therefore leads to higher benefits."' 0 Some
thus prescribe "logrolling" in decentralized legislatures to allow for
market-like trading." Others advocate metropolitan fragmentation to
permit individual choice among local governmental jurisdictions and
a "competitive market" for local public services.' 2 As sketched in the
10. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFr. 343, 349-50 (1972).
11. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 145 (1962).
12. See Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL ECON. 416,
416-24 (1956).
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preceding section, economists have even argued that bribery is bene-
ficial because it gives individuals a market-like opportunity to indicate
their preferences with regard to waiting in line.
Rose-Ackerman's book is the latest in a series of analyses that have
cast doubt on the universal applicability of the Invisible Hand prin-
ciple. Logrolling may in fact lead to irrational and inefficient group
choice, 13 and the conditions under which market-like metropolitan
fragmentation leads to efficiency now seem to be extremely strong and
perhaps objectionable.14 Most convincingly, Sen has demonstrated as a
completely general proposition that it is impossible to guarantee ef-
ficiency in a decentralized context. 15 Rose-Ackerman's discovery that
market-like bribery does not lead to administrative efficiency adds
further evidence that market-like behavior may well be appropriate
only in the market. Rose-Ackerman herself feels that
[t]his book's demonstration that widespread corruption can be
consistent with even a grossly idealized version of representative
democracy is an especially stark version of the general proposition
that competition and decentralization in political life do not as-
sure beneficial outcomes. This is perhaps the simplest and most
far reaching implication of sophisticated economic models of
government. 16
VI. Economics and Honesty
From first to last, Rose-Ackerman makes the case that microeco-
nomic theory, based as it is on a model of rational, self-interested in-
dividuals, provides no solution to the problem of corruption. It seems
to be impossible to construct a system in which honesty is always the
self-interested policy; in any system, some actors will always be exposed
to incentives for corruption.
To Rose-Ackerman, the ever-present incentives to corruption seem
to reveal the limits of economic theory. Since some individuals are
always exposed to tempting corruption, then we must transcend eco-
nomic theory to study how we can instill a belief in democratic ideals
and honesty in political participants; "the analysis leads one to em-
13. For a summary of this argument, see S. BRAms, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 125-56
(1975).
14. See, e.g., Hamilton, Mills & Puryear, The Tiebout Hypothesis and Residential In-
come Segregation, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 101-02 (E. Mills & W. Oates
eds. 1975). This essay shows that a system of exclusionary zoning creating complete income
stratification is necessary for market-like choice to result in market-like efficiency in
metropolitan areas.
15. See A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
16. P. 216.
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phasize the importance of personal morality in explaining the viability
of democratic government in a market economy." 17 This necessity of
personal morality limits the role of economic theory, for economic
analysis "cannot explain the origination and transmission of the
democratic and personal ideals required to preserve a functioning
mixed economy."' 18
The argument runs as follows: despite the fact that corruption is
always in the interest of some participants, our society seems to toddle
along in a fairly stable way. Therefore, some political actors must be
resisting the temptation of personal corruption out of a personal com-
mitment to honesty, or democratic government; "the continuing opera-
tion of familiar institutions would be inexplicable in the absence of
wide-spread personal commitments to honesty and democratic ideals."'19
Ironically, I, as a political scientist, found this discussion of the limits
of economic analysis the only section of the book in which Rose-
Ackerman's argument relies on several unstated and, I feel, dubious
assumptions. The missing links are the implicit assumptions that the
"viability of democratic government in a market economy" implies
that someone out there must be resisting the temptation to be corrupt,
and the further assumption that contemporary society is an instance of
viable, "stable operation" of such a mixed system. To take the second
assumption first, there are certainly people who would doubt that our
society is viable, stable, or democratic. And since Rose-Ackerman fails
to define these broad terms adequately, it is difficult to resolve the
question. But if indeed the doubters are correct, and society is un-
viable, unstable, or undemocratic, then the paradox that Rose-Acker-
man attempts to demonstrate is not a paradox. If the state of the world
is corrupt and falling apart, then Rose-Ackerman's economic theory is
quite capable of explaining why.
The first implicit assumption raises still graver difficulties, for cor-
ruption may in fact be wholly consistent with viable democracy. Why
infer from the fact that the trains run on time or that social security
checks occasionally appear in the right mailboxes that there must be a
lot of civil servants and politicians out there resisting the inevitable
temptations of evil? Granting the author's conclusion that no political
institution can insulate all actors from incentives toward corruption,
it does not necessarily follow that society will fall into a state of
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any number of societies (perhaps including our own) corruption is an
accepted and inevitable part of the functioning of institutions. Many
of these societies would be called viable; some, including Italy and
Mexico, would even be called "democratic" by some observers. Rose-
Ackerman's claim that incentives for corruption would lead to societal
decay if political actors were not committed to democratic ideals is
completely outside the range of her model-building and is in fact
empirically questionable.
It is possible to deplore corruption for ethical reasons without as-
suming that ethical education is the only hope for democracy. Rose-
Ackerman's belief that this first serious attempt to understand the
political economy of corruption already has defined the outer limits
of usefulness of economic analysis is unduly pessimistic. For me, the
import of her book is quite the opposite: since serious study of the
economics of corruption is only beginning, we may be able to do a
great deal more than we are now doing to limit corruption by chang-
ing institutional incentives.
Conclusion
In a sense, Rose-Ackerman's argument regarding the limits of eco-
nomic analysis is best countered by her own success in Corruption. Al-
though the extent to which she advances formal theory is uneven (the
discussion of interest groups is largely an informal application of
previous theories, for example), her theory of administrative behavior
moves that body of literature forward significantly. Furthermore, her
ability to summarize, consolidate, and apply the entire range of political
economic theory to her subject area is uniformly excellent. I believe
the book must be considered as a testament to the expanding scope of
political economic theory, rather than as a statement of its limitations.
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Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law. By Joseph Vining.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978. Pp. xiii, 214.
516.oo.
Reviewed by Richard B. Stewartt
Imagine, if you can, Pascal, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Baudelaire,
Marx, Wittgenstein writing on standing to secure judicial review of
federal administrative action. You will then have some conception of
this remarkable, beautifully written, but incompletely realized book.
Professor Vining's story is the "breakdown of individualism as a
basis for legal reasoning"' and its replacement by communitarian
"public values," as illustrated by the evolution of standing doctrine in
federal administrative law. The story proceeds, often simultaneously,
at two levels: lawyer-like analysis of the doctrine enunciated by courts,
and lyric evocation of changes in moral vision that assertedly underlie
the development of that doctrine.
I
Traditionally, the interests entitled to judicial protection were de-
fined by the common law. A litigant could challenge official actions
infringing his liberty or property if the same actions undertaken by a
private individual would constitute a common law tort. The responsible
official might seek to justify the infringement on the ground that it
was authorized by statute. Litigation challenging a prima facie tort
thus became a vehicle for judicial review of the scope of official
authority. However, if the official's conduct would not be actionable
at common law when performed by a private individual, a citizen as-
sertedly injured would lack standing to challenge such conduct as not
authorized by statute.2
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAw 2 (1978) [herein-
after cited by page number only].
2. Pp. 20-27; see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 1667, 1717-18, 1724 (1975). Although he focuses on the private tort model of
standing, Vining acknowledges (without exploring) a second traditional basis for judicial
review of official action: the common law writs, such as mandamus and certiorari,
developed by courts for the specific purpose of controlling official action. See L. JAFFE,
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Vining chronicles the progressive breakdown in recent decades of
this model, which he views as a "myth" created by the common law
judges to control the king's servants. 3 The breakdown began when
courts agreed to review official inaction even though such inaction
would not constitute a common law wrong,4 and when they relaxed
ripeness doctrines to permit review of agency promulgation of regula-
tions not yet coercively enforced. 5 A decisive step was the extension of
standing to third parties not themselves subject to coercive govern-
ment regulation but affected by regulation of others. Under this ap-
proach, standing was extended to competitors of regulated firms and
beneficiaries (such as airline travelers or television viewers) of regula-
tory schemes.6 The common law test of standing received its final coup
de grace in the Supreme Court's 1970 decision, Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.7
Vining celebrates this process of disintegration, rejecting any effort
to limit standing in administrative law by reference to a private-dispute-
resolving model, which he views as "atavistic." In modern society,
government policies have a "Donne effect"; their reverberating conse-
quences touch all.8 Accordingly, he concludes, it is not analytically
tenable to limit standing under a statute to a subclass of citizens in-
vested with rights against officials owing them correlative duties.
II
At this doctrinal level, the book's analysis is acute but hardly path-
breaking, and could be easily contained in a conventional law review
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 152-96, 459-90 (1965). Vining deals exclusively
with standing in the federal courts, where these writs have been used less extensively and
less liberally than in many state courts. The writ system, in which standing has sometimes
been extended to taxpayers or citizens as such, may well imply a different ethos of public
law than the private tort model that the federal courts have characteristically followed.
The general assertions that Vining often makes about the nature of public law and its
evolution must be qualified by the book's exclusive focus on federal law.
3. Pp. 21-22.
4. See pp. 34-35; Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939);
Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69
MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1466-69 (1971).
5. See pp. 70-79; Vining, supra note 4, at 1501-31.
6. See pp. 35-39; Stewart, supra note 2, at 1723-34.
7. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
8. Pp. 85-86, 102-23. The pervasive effects of government action are termed by Vining
the "Donne effect" after the "No Man is an Iland" passage in Donne's Devotions XVII,
cited by Justice Blackmun in dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760 n.2
(1972). An alternative metaphor might be economic; we could speak of the "general
equilibrium" effect. See J. SCHUMPErER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 951-1053 (1954)
(general equilibrium analysis). This metaphor may suggest the continued viability of the
private law model when it is suitably adapted to deal with the problems of collective
goods.
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article. What makes for a remarkable book is Vining's vision of a
shifting moral order that underlies doctrinal development, and the
richly allusive prose style in which that vision is expressed. To Vining,
the common law test assumes an individualist ethic in which values are
essentially personal and subjective, and litigation involves "a dispute
between individuals over the allocation of means to achieve their
privately chosen ends."" But this ethic is an essentially false one because
values have meaning and existence only insofar as they can be spoken
of in a communal language and realized through the scheme of social
solidarity that the law secures. Individual self-development is a process
of participation in the evolution of shared public values.
The decline of the common law test and the consequent stripping
away of limits on standing deserve celebration, Vining believes, because
they make more explicit the foundation of the legal order in a com-
munity of public values. Why this development should have occurred
is obscure. Extension of standing to those speaking for "noneconomic"
values such as environmental quality can be explained in part by the
increasingly apparent "spillover" effects in an industrialized society,
and the consequent recognition of widely shared interests-such as the
interest in a healthy environment-in resources that cannot be privately
appropriated and can be secured only through collective action.' 0 But
the recognition in standing doctrine of community solidarity also re-
flects a Kuhnian shift in legal consciousness, a consciousness that now
"sees" the social world as more "connected." Vining confesses that this
shift cannot be wholly explained."
With the breakdown of the private-dispute-resolving model, courts
determine standing by assessing the values for which litigants speak.
Standing is conferred if the value is sufficiently widely shared to con-
stitute a public value that warrants protection and advancement
through the law's disposition of social force. In deciding the merits,
courts reconcile the various public values that have been recognized
through rulings on standing. Other institutions, including the legisla-
ture and administrative agencies, also serve to confirm and adjust public
values. But judges play a special, higher role: "that of the priest or
elder, associated with the role of the judge long before the necessities
of feudal life produced, and the doctrines of laissez faire reinforced,
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For Vining, the special virtue of judges is their institutional capability
to "look continuously at the whole" fabric of public values:
As other institutions that also shared the priestly tradition have
disappeared, the importance of this aspect of the notion of what it
is to be a judge has grown. No society pursuing a multitude of
public values of different weight through a multitude of largely
independent agencies has ever tried to do without such central
coordination.... The process of perceiving, announcing, reconcil-
ing, and choosing between the values at stake in particular situa-
tions-the judicial process-affects planning and, more important,
affects the choice of values to be served by planning. It is an in-
tegral part of government. 13
The courts' function is a "priestly" one because the life of the in-
dividual is an evolutionary sharing of public values through a succes-
sion of roles or identities: environmentalist, investor, homemaker,
agitator, nonsmoker. In ruling whether a given individual has stand-
ing to secure judicial protection of a value for which he or she claims
to speak, the court decides whether potential new roles or identities
will be given social recognition and validation through the legal sys-
tem. For the individual, the proliferation of new identities or value-
roles brings enrichment but also frustration because "death or burial"
beckons and all roles cannot be fully realized:
Men are made equally restless by the lack of realization of one or
another of their desires. They drive for security and then drive
for challenge. They sacrifice for generations to build smiling
landscapes. They sacrifice landscapes to the thrill of war and
triumph. They withdraw to brood about how they might have
both.14
The courts, however, are immortal even though judges are not. They
steadily pursue Marx's utopian vision of the potential fullness of life
by articulating the evolving harmonies among superficially divergent
roles, identities, and values, thus fostering a "larger symbiosis of
desires."' 5
Vining develops this vision in dialectic with doctrinal analysis
through writing that is by turns epigrammatic, dandified, oracular,
ironic. The orderly straightforward "roadmap" character of most legal
academic writing is replaced by a circuitous, affective, subterranean
exploration of legal consciousness. Vining's elliptical style reflects ap-
13. Id.
14. P. 162 n.
15. Pp. 89, 113, 151-68.
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preciation of a journey not yet completed, a consciousness that is im-
manent but unrealized. Evolution of external doctrine is more readily
perceived than potential transformation in underlying vision, a trans-
formation often conveyed through asides and aper.us.
Consider, for example, Vining on the Kantian, noninstrumental
character of legal analysis: "[W]hen we contemplate a concept, we have
in mind a mirror instead of a tool." 16 He rejects the notion that his-
torical or economic necessities determine the evolution of legal doc-
trine:
[N]ecessity has a recognized place, a place in law. It does not prowl
unleashed and sub rosa through the prediction, explanation, or
making of judicial decisions. It is dealt with explicitly through
numerous doctrines courts and lawyers use in judicial review, such
as the substantial evidence rule; and doctrines that incorporate
notions of necessity are not less subject to intellectual analysis for
being "pragmatic." They present to the mind the paradoxes of a
Heraclitean world filled with too little time.17
Or consider the problems faced by courts in untangling causal
responsibility for past events:
The bird that flies across the evening sunset would be flying
elsewhere if the nearby road had not been built. What will the
bird do now? Eat the mosquito that might give your child enceph-
alitis? The consequences of an event radiate out in . . .myriad
directions.... The present is a pulsating, organic whole; the past
is a succession of states like the present, and the future is unknown.
Of course courts find difficulty in discussing what they perceive.
It threatens the atomistic premise of legal thought and language,
which divides reality into cases, structures them into bipolar form,
arrests the passage of time .... I
The difficulties in structuring the past are sometimes overwhelming:
Causal chains do not run in parallel straight lines into the future,
to be clipped or moved here and there by the remedial hand. They
grow, branch, intertwine, curl back, some faster and some slower
but all at a rate that seems breathless in relation to our capacity
to follow them. Even the materials a court has directly in hand,
under its "jurisdiction," change and dissolve while the court is in
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In extreme cases, judges grown fearful escape by an inarticulate denial
of plaintiff's standing to maintain suit: "Fear may make it too difficult
to admit, except by allusion, that one is swimming in the sea and that
one's behavior is a reaction to it. Denial is a normal defense of the
human mind against great fear; the legal mind is not peculiar in this
regard." 20
At the end of the journey, Vining speculates that the disintegration
of the private-dispute-resolving model of administrative law may lead
us to understand that public values underlie not only public law but
private law as well. Although private law seems to postulate merely
personal ends, "the role of the legal system has always been to main-
tain the primacy of public values in social decision making."2 1 The
legal system cannot rest on ethical solipsisms; it can only protect those
values that men and women can articulate to one another and recognize
one another as bearing. "The active pursuit of shared and evolving
ends . . . animates the judicial role. . . . The language of rights has
become increasingly foreign to a description of the process, both in its
suggestion of rigidity and its emphasis upon the separateness of human
beings." 22 The expansion of standing in public-law litigation to those
who speak for community values encourages us to see the entire legal
system as driven by an instinct of solidarity:
The latin tag for standing, still used in Britain, was locus standi,
a place to stand. The natural image was geographical .... How
easy it was to assume that the purpose of courts was the defense of
property and that individuals were separate. A litigant argued
from a spot that, because it was geographical, no two could occupy
at once. The image of the litigant today is quite different. Standing
means standing for, representing, and in this there is no suggestion
of necessary exclusivity and property, or of the separateness of men.
Litigation can now bring home as forcefully as any religious
ritual that each of us is in fact involved in mankind. Public law
has come of age.23
20. P. 94. Judges themselves have alluded in troubled tone to this "trackless ocean."
See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
21. P. 47.
22. P. 130. Vining elsewhere suggests that "most of the valued end states of life are
shared rather than private, achievements of a life beyond oneself and escapes from lone-
liness and alienation." P. 32. The entire book is suffused with the elegiac mood of the
intellectual in search of community. Cf. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. Rv. 1 (1977) (develop-
ing relations between law and personal identity that resemble some of Vining's themes).
23. P. 181.
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Vining's vision is arresting, evocative, extravagant, even a touch
mad. But is it true to our understanding of legal thought and the social
order? Certainly it is selective and one-sided. The clash of contending
interests in litigation and legislation, the distributional struggles that
so occupy the world, are presented as mere surface flux that obscures
the underlying, evolving harmony of human interests. The priestly
role that Vining posits for the courts will understandably strike many
as sanctified tyranny, implausible humbug, or just plain silly. Yet how
do we measure insight, truth, verisimilitude in the study of legal
consciousness?
Insofar as legal consciousness is understood as moral vision, the
measure is most difficult to identify. One might turn to the rhetoric of
the opinions in the principal decisions that expand standing; but this
rhetoric betrays little or nothing of Vining's vision.2 4 Alternatively,
one might assess the congruence between Vining's approach and more
general trends in legal and political thought. Vining's communitarian
ideal finds important confirmation in other recent writing2 5 Yet we are
also witnessing a remarkable resurgence of individualist premises in
legal and political thought,26 which suggests that the private-law model
has roots far deeper than the necessity for a myth through which judges
could control the king's servants. A third alternative is introspection:
the reader can examine the extent to which Vining's themes find
resonance in his own thought and understanding of law. Here each
reader must answer individually.
At the doctrinal level, shortcomings in Vining's thesis are easier to
document. That thesis finds at best shaky support in the decisional
law. Developments since Data Processing undercut Vining's claim that
24. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The judicial language that provides
clearest support for Vining's "public values" vision is the quotation from Donne in Justice
Blackmun's Sierra Club opinion. See note 8 supra. Significantly, this opinion was written
in dissent from the Court's refusal to extend standing to organizations claiming to speak
for widely shared ideological values.
I am indebted to my colleague Richard Parker for the thesis that the rhetoric in
judicial opinions both expresses and reflects links between doctrine and legal and political
consciousness. In an article in progress he develops this thesis in the context of constitu-
tional adjudication.
25. See, e.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1974); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Klare, Judicial Deradicaliza-
tion of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62
MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
26. See, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UToPIA (1974); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). But see note 25 suPra
(citing sources); Karst, supra note 22.
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the decision has ushered in a new era of standing doctrine based on
public values. In several more recent decisions the Supreme Court has
limited standing to instances involving direct invasions by government
officials of concrete interests in personal autonomy establishing "injury
in fact"-a telltale harkening back to the private-law model.27 In a
closely analogous doctrinal field, not discussed by Vining, the Court
has repeatedly invoked the model of private entitlements to limit
sharply the availability of procedural due process protections in ad-
ministrative decisionmaking.25
Data Processing itself-which Vining celebrates as the key step in
the emergence of public values-was, I believe, a disastrous decision.
As elaborated below, it has brought unnecessary confusion by wantonly
destroying pre-existing law that was sound in principle, reasonably
coherent, and capable of accommodating desirable extensions of stand-
ing. Vining fails to come to grips with these problems, or to address
adequately the doctrinal and institutional implications of his "public
values" thesis.
At the outset of his book, Vining argues that the law of standing is a
worthy vehicle by which to study legal thought and the social com-
munity because of its immediate impact on the exercise of government
power to further societal values:
Each day, in a thousand courts, judges ask the simple, practical
question: Do I have legal authority to listen to your arguments?
If an answer to that question cannot be given at all, either Yes or
No, social life ceases and organization crumbles, because no man
can go far to achieve his ends alone and without the ultimate sanc-
tion of a body disposing of social force.- 9
27. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), the Supreme Court
reiterated the requirement, established in Sierra Club, that an organization must establish
particular injury to one of its members or to itself as an organization in order to secure
standing. This requirement has created potential standing problems for "public interest"
organizations challenging federal agency action. See Hager, Nader Hit with Challenge to
Standing, Legal Times, Feb. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 4; cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (rejecting lower court ruling that federal courts enjoy gen-
eral power to award attorneys' fees and litigation expenses-payable by private defendants-
to plaintiffs who represent "public interests" and who successfully challenge administrative
action as contrary to statute).
28. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
However, Vining might take aid and comfort from the breakdown of the individualist
model in public-law litigation in the federal district courts. See Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Rav. 1281 (1976).
29. P. 7.
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He also explicitly recognizes that such a study must be grounded in
doctrinal mastery.30 But these salutary injunctions are ignored by
Vining once he finishes chronicling the collapse of the common law
model of standing and begins to elaborate his competing vision. The
"simple practical" questions of standing continue. When may environ-
mental groups challenge governmental decisions authorizing or en-
couraging private conduct that threatens environmental harm? When
may the poor invoke regulatory or tax measures assertedly provided
for their benefit? The judges' answers conflict, vacillate, confound.
Data Processing announced two prerequisites to standing: that a
litigant suffer "injury in fact" as a result of the challenged official
action, and that he be "arguably within the zone of interests protected
or regulated" by the organic statute governing the controversy.31 Since
Data Processing, the Supreme Court has tacitly abandoned the "argu-
ably within the zone" test as unintelligible or unenforceable, and has
manipulated the opaque "injury in fact" concept in furtherance of its
discretion to grant or deny standing in particular cases. 3- The decisions
have not been adequately explained or reconciled, and have restored in
full measure to federal standing law its celebrated obscurity.3 3 Vining
makes no serious effort at elucidation. He welcomes Data Processing
and the wreckage of the past but is unable or unwilling to relate the
doctrinal and institutional problems of today to his vision of courts'
priestly role in the evolution of moral life in society.
In Vining's account, courts in the post-Data Processing era will (or
should) grant standing when (a) judges see a value as sufficiently closely
identified with an individual's activities or beliefs that he can sincerely
speak for it, and (b) judges also see the value as sufficiently widely
shared to justify recognition as a public value. But Vining admits that
"we do not know how a value becomes a public value."34 Nor can
Vining offer useful criteria for their identification. Apparently judges
just know a public value when they see it. "Public values" become
30. See p. 7 ("The study of law is a powerful means of access to the communal mind,
and we have only a few. But it must be particularized. Depart from the law's doctrinal
structure, the language in which law actually speaks, and the method loses its strength.")
31. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
32. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972) with Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
(1978) and United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
33. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970) ('Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.") This insight
did not deter the Court in that case from advancing sweeping changes in standing doc-
trine. Cf. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953) (standing as
"complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction").
34. P. 171.
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noumena the existence or nonexistence of which can only be inferred
by observers from the judges' result. When the Supreme Court in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization3 denies low-
income individuals standing to challenge a tax ruling that relaxes free-
care requirements for hospitals seeking tax-deductible charitable status,
Vining concludes that the Court did not "see" poverty as a public
value.3 6 By the same token, when in United States v. SCRAP,3 7 the
Court grants standing to a group of law students protesting a nation-
wide railroad rate increase as an obstacle to recycling, the justices have
thereby indicated that they "see" environmental values as public. 3 8 But
when the same Court a year earlier denied standing in Sierra Club v.
Morton,3 9 it must have failed to see environmental values as public. 4 0
This approach is unhelpful and unenlightening, not least because it
ignores or minimizes the institutional and prudential considerations
that play an important role in standing decisions, regardless of the
"public values" asserted to be at stake.41 To explain all standing
decisions as judicial recognition or nonrecognition of public values is
excessively reductionist. Simon was clearly informed by considerations,
admittedly inarticulate, as to the appropriate role of courts in the
evolution of tax policy. Sierra Club and SCRAP are in part distin-
guished by the fact that plaintiffs' counsel manufactured the standing
issue in Sierra Club, because they wished the Court to make a radical
extension of standing doctrine that the Court viewed as unnecessary
to the disposition of the case at hand. 42 In SCRAP, on the other hand,
35. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
86. Pp. 175-76 n.
37. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
38. P. 175.
89. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
40. Vining castigates Sierra Club as "bizarre." Pp. 158-59 n. For an attempted explica-
tion and justification of Sierra Club, see Stewart, supra note 2, at 1737-47.
41. Near the outset of the book Vining notes Alexander Bickel's view (developed in
the context of constitutional cases) that judges adjust doctrines of standing in response to
institutional constraints and objectives. P. 10 (discussing A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH (1962)). Vining notes the plausibility of the thesis, but brands it "Machia-
vellian" and does not pursue its implications. He discusses the institutional limitations of
courts in the restricted context of damage remedies in cases involving major efforts to
unravel complex causal issues. Pp. 80-101. However, he does not address the institutional
and remedial concerns that inform recent Supreme Court decisions restricting access to
federal court. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 428 U.S. 362 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975). Although these are constitutional cases, in which institutional and remedial prob-
lems are more acute, similar concerns are reflected in rulings limiting standing to review
federal administrative action as contrary to statute. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
42. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Counsel for the Sierra Club had
deliberately refrained from alleging (as was in fact the case) that Club members visited the
Mineral King Valley, the commercial development of which was being challenged by the
Club. Counsel apparently did so in an effort to obtain a broad ruling that environmental
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plaintiffs had based standing on a recent statute-the National Environ-
mental Policy Act 43-in which Congress had strongly affirmed its recog-
nition of environmental values. By ignoring or discounting such factors,
Vining overplays his insight that rulings on standing also reflect judicial
assessments of emerging societal values.
Vining is certainly correct in viewing Data Processing as a decisive
step in the evolution of standing law. But while he celebrates the
decision, I view it as an unredeemed disaster. Prior to Data Processing,
federal standing law was divided into three parts. In the absence of
specific statutory provisions entitling designated persons or parties to
judicial review, standing could be based upon present or threatened
official infringement of an interest protected at common law; upon an
interest substantively protected by a relevant organic statute (the statu-
torily protected-interest test); or upon an adverse economic impact when
a relevant statute afforded standing to persons "adversely affected" or
"aggrieved." 44 This triad provided a perfectly rational and sensible
doctrinal structure affording ample flexibility for recognition of emerg-
ing societal interests through judicial expansion of the statutorily pro-
tected-interest test. For example, during the 1960s some judges shared
with other observers a developing disquiet over the apparent failure of
regulatory agencies to protect consumers, television viewers, or environ-
mental interests. In response, they expanded the statutorily protected-
interest rationale to afford representatives of such groups standing.45
Data Processing inexplicably ignored this established doctrinal struc-
ture and plucked the "arguably within the zone" and "injury in fact"
tests out of thin air. In post-Data Processing decisions, "injury in fact"
has become an unpredictable catchall to tag conclusions based on
factors not adequately articulated or explained. 40 The test of "injury"
has been confused with the Article III "case or controversy" require-
ment, thereby raising unjustified doubt as to the constitutionality of
organizations have standing to challenge any administrative complicity in environmental
degradation. The Court, fearful of the implications of a broad ruling that would allow
organizations standing based on ideological interests, insisted that an organization establish
tangible injury to its members or to itself as an organization. See id. at 735-36 n.8, 739-40.
Subsequently the Sierra Club successfully moved to amend its complaint to include allega-
tions of its members' use of the Valley and thereby obtained standing.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
44. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th
Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Stewart, suPra note 2, at 1723-37.
45. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
46. See notes 27 & 32 suPra (citing cases).
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statutory "citizen suit" provisions. 47 In a reversal of sound practice,
standing is now granted more readily in constitutional cases than in
nonconstitutional cases. 48
Despite these developments and his own failure to provide a post-
Data Processing structure for standing law, Vining would clearly op-
pose any resurrection of the pre-Data Processing triad as an "atavistic"
return to the private-dispute-resolving model. He raises three objec-
tions to the statutorily protected-interest rationale as an elastic frame-
work for according standing to representatives of emerging societal
interests. These objections do not shake my preference for that frame-
work over the unstructured "public values" alternative offered by
Vining.
The first objection is that the rationale admits of no logical stopping
47. Data Processing's "injury in fact" test was a gloss on the statutory provision for
standing found in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The equation
of "injury in fact" with the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement was adum-
brated in Data Processing and made explicit in Simon, see 426 U.S. at 39-46. This equation
has the highly undesirable effect of transforming into constitutional cases the everyday
rulings on standing to challenge administrative action as violative of a given statute. If
the equation were taken literally, Congress would be precluded from overturning restric-
tive standing rulings such as Simon.
Further confusion is created by use of the same injury-in-fact label in ruling on stand-
ing to challenge official action as contrary to constitutional provisions. This common use
of "injury in fact" is unfortunate. In cases in which official action is challenged as un-
constitutional, more restrictive principles of standing (whether mandated by Article III
or merely prudential) are warranted because the constitutional ruling on an issue repre-
sents a complete and final judicial override of the political process. By contrast, when a
statutory issue is involved, Congress can effectively reverse the court's ruling on the
merits. The fact that constitutional rulings entirely displace the political process justifies
more stringent threshold requirements with respect to whether a controversy has fully
matured and whether plaintiff's interest is sufficiently concrete and substantial to serve as
a basis for judicial intervention.
The Court's equation of "injury in fact" with Article III requirements and its failure to
distinguish constitutional and statutory cases cast an unjustified cloud on federal environ-
mental statutes that authorize "any person" to bring suit for nonenforcement of statutory
duties. See Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IowA L. REV. 1221,
1274-80 (1977). Although injury-in-fact rulings such as Simon threaten the validity of these
citizen-suit provisions, the better view would hold them constitutional. See Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions:
Is it a Constitutional Requirement? 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant
in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033
(1968).
48. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
72-78 (1978), the Court apparently abandoned for most constitutional cases the "zone of
interests" test that, at least in theory, governs challenges to government action as viola-
tive of statute. Although nominally broadening standing doctrine in favor of environ-
mental plaintiffs, the evident purpose of the Court's ruling was to enable it to reach the
merits in order to sustain the constitutionality of the statute in question. See 438 U.S. at
102-03 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The decision is thus an illustration of
Alexander Bickel's "Machiavellian" thesis. See note 41 supra.
Sound analysis, however, would dictate the reverse of Duke Power: more restrictive
judge-made standing rules in constitutional than in statutory cases. See note 47 supra.
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point because of the inclusive "Donne effects" of government decisions
and because Congress cannot be assumed indifferent to any such effect.
Legions of interests are affected by a given legislative choice, and all are
implicitly, contextually "protected." 4.5 Yet Vining acknowledges the
need for limits to standing; he would not embrace the "public action"
framework in which any citizen could challenge any assertedly unlawful
action by any official. ' Considerations of sound administration and
decision counsel limits on those who can compel judicial assessment
(with concomitant procedural formalities at the agency level) of an
administrator's treatment of their interests. 51
Relevant organic statutes are the most appropriate starting point for
the choice of limits. Although I agree with Vining that it is unrealistic
and unwise to require specific congressional "intent" as a prerequisite
to recognizing new classes of interests as statutorily protected, the stat-
utory framework provides a necessary and useful point of reference. It
reminds judges and scholars alike that Congress, save in exceptional
cases, is entitled to the last word on standing. Even when Congress has
not ruled explicitly, courts should be encouraged to grant standing
more liberally in favor of interests for which Congress has voiced strong
support.52 The statutory framework also encourages judges to assess
the standing issue in light of the impact of judicial review on the
operation of a particular system of statutory administration. Such an
assessment may produce a grant of standing to an interest in the con-
text of one statutory scheme, and the denial of standing to the same
interest in the context of a different statutory scheme. 53
Second, Vining objects to the statutorily protected-interest rationale
because it implies a bilateral, individualistic system of rights on the
49. Pp. 106-17.
50. Pp. 130-35. For discussion of the "public action" framework, see Jaffe, supra note
47. Recognition of the "public action" framework would obviate the need to identify
values that are sufficiently widely shared to serve as a basis of standing from those that
are not, since any person (or, perhaps, citizen) could bring suit regardless of his or her
interest. The "public action" framework would thus erase the dialectic of values that
Vining champions, and would imply a formal equality of all citizens before the law that
smacks of the individualist ethic.
51. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1731-33, 1735-36.
52. For example, the decision in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), grant-
ing standing to an unincorporated group of law students to challenge asserted agency
noncompliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), may be properly ex-
plained on the ground that NEPA was enacted in part to require the dissemination of
information to groups of citizens with an active interest in the environmental conse-
quences of government action. See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d
1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The statutes involved in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972), did not betray any comparable purpose to benefit environmental groups in
general.
53. See note 52 sutra.
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part of those whose interests are protected, and duties on the part of
officials. Vining believes this framework to be inconsistent with the
emerging importance of interests-such as interests in environmental
quality-in resources the benefits of which are collectively shared
rather than exclusively owned by one individual or another. Vining
supposes that such shared interests establish the existence of com-
munal "end values" that should be recognized as such.
Economists have taught the pervasive importance of collective goods
that cannot be made available to one person without simultaneously
being made available to others.5 4 However, the nonexcludability factor
that defines collective goods does not by itself establish shared end-
values. The naturalist may value clean air for the enhanced bird-
watching opportunities it affords, the housebound emphysematic for
its healthful qualities. The recognition of rights in collective goods
admittedly imposes strains on traditional legal thinking, but to sup-
pose, as Vining does, that entitlements can only be created through a
system of exclusive ownership may be anachronistic. 55 Courts have
based standing on individuals' statutorily protected interest in collec-
tive goods;50 Vining does not establish why such an approach is un-
tenable or inferior to an untethered conception of "public values."
Third, Vining argues that limiting standing to defined classes of
beneficiaries under a statutory entitlement rationale is inconsistent
with the asserted judicial practice of permitting a litigant, once afforded
standing, to advance any conceivable public policy consideration that
might support the result on the merits sought by that litigant. 7 In
light of this practice, Vining argues, it is illogical to base standing on
the narrower ground of whether the litigant's private interests are
protected by a relevant statute. He appears instead to suggest that stand-
ing should be granted to any person who can sincerely speak for the
various public values that might be addressed on the merits.58
The fault in this argument lies in its premise regarding practice on
54. See, e.g., M. OISON, THE LOGIc OF COLLECTIVE AcTiON 5-16 (1965); Davidson, The
Valuation of Public Goods, in EcONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 345-55 (R. Dorfman & N.
Dorfman eds. 1972).
55. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency has developed proposals to
create transferable rights to use air basins (common properties) for pollutant discharge;
these proposals have been legislatively endorsed in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-
18571 (1976). See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 587-95 (2d ed.
1978).
56. See, e.g., note 45 supra (citing cases).
57. Pp. 117-19.
58. Id. Although Vining rejects the possibility of identifying discrete classes of statutory
beneficiaries, he apparently assumes that standing requires some link between the value
asserted by a litigant and the operation of the relevant statutory scheme. Pp. 118, 121.
However, Vining fails to discuss explicitly the nature of that link.
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the merits; I am not persuaded that the practice is or should be as Vin-
ing claims. True, the Supreme Court in Sierra Club stated that a
private injury was necessary for standing but that once standing was
granted a litigant could argue the "interests of the general public." 59
But I do not believe that this statement, which concerns the criteria for
the courts' exercise of equitable discretion, can be read in the sweeping
way that Vining supposes. 60
The considerations that a litigant may advance on the merits should
normally be no broader or narrower than those that the litigant may
assert to secure standing.61 Those considerations, however, should
relate to the interests of that litigant. Once he has obtained standing, a
litigant may argue any aspect of public policy relevant to the court's
assessment of whether an administrator owes a duty to act on or give
weight to the litigant's interest. But with rare exceptions a litigant may
not argue, as a ground for an administrative or judicial ruling in his
favor, duties or consideration owed to the interests of others. 62
59. See Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, 740 n.15 (1972) ("Once . . . standing is
established, the party may assert the interests of the general public in support of his
claims for equitable relief.")
60. Pp. 118-19. In context, the Court's statement seems to indicate no more than that
the public's interest will be taken into account in determining whether to grant a
preliminary injunction against an administrative action. This, of course, is traditional
doctrine. See, e.g., Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir.
1977); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers' Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
61. Exceptions to this statement include instances in which a litigant bases standing on
infringement of an interest protected at common law, and those rare cases when it is ap-
propriate to allow a litigant to assert the interests of another through surrogate standing
or jus tertii. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE LJ. 425 (1974); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1742-47;
Note, The Environmental Impact Statement Requirement in Agency Enforcement Ad-
judication, 91 HARV. L. REv. 815, 835-39 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Im-
Pact]. For discussion in the context of constitutional claims, see Note, Standing to Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 423 (1974).
Vining and I apparently agree, with Professor Albert, that the grounds for standing and
the grounds that a litigant may argue on the merits should normally be the same. How-
ever, Vining would read those grounds broadly to include public values, whereas I would
limit them to the statutorily protected interests of the particular litigant.
62. See note 61 supra (citing authorities). A private utility threatened by increased
competition from a new TVA generating plant could not obtain standing to challenge its
construction on the ground that the plant would cause local environmental damage. See
Environmental Impact, supra note 61 at 836-38. Even if the private utility could obtain
standing on the ground that the plant's construction assertedly violated a statute pro-
tecting TVA's competitors, see Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), there is
no reason why the utility should be permitted to rely upon the local environmental
damage as a point in its favor on the merits. If a representative of one interest is per-
mitted to argue for an administrative obligation based on considerations that would only
be relevant to establish such an obligation with respect to some other interest, conflicts of
interest in advocacy and poor decisions by agencies or reviewing courts are likely to
result. This analysis explains and justifies rulings such as United Egg Producers v. Bauer
Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), noted by Vining at p. 133, in which the
competitor of an agricultural cooperative was denied standing qua consumer to challenge
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Vining would abandon these limitations by permitting a litigant to
obtain standing on the basis of general "public values" and to advance
such values as a ground for a decision in his favor on the merits. This
approach would set judicial decision utterly at large. Litigation and
the parties to it would become contrivances to float public values for
judges to endorse or reject for purposes unknown. We could hardly
call such a process adjudication. Administrative decision is appro-
priately viewed-at least in the context of judicial review-as an align-
ment or accommodation of societal interests borne by particular classes
of litigants, rather than as an unstructured quest for "legality" vel non
or for "public values."
IV
Admittedly, the conclusion of this doctrinal analysis raises anew the
general question posed by Professor Vining. Is the persistent tendency
to view legal determinations as resolving competing interests held by
individuals simply the atavistic afterglow of a private-dispute-resolving
model whose day is past? Or does it reflect a conception of law that is
ineluctable because we can understand "law" in no other terms? The
features that we view as most deeply characteristic of a legal system-
the rule of law, like treatment of like cases, due process-also seem
rooted in a model of individual rights and obligations. If Vining is
indeed correct in his perception of an emergent jurisprudence of public
values, quite revolutionary changes may be expected.
the cooperative's conduct under the antitrust laws because of "conflicting and divided
interest[s]" between the competitor and consumers, 312 F. Supp. at 321.
Support for a broader approach might be found in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), or FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Duke Power stated that a sufficiently close causal nexus
between government action and injury-in-fact to the plaintiff would enable the plaintiff
to challenge that action's validity under any applicable law. 438 U.S. at 72-81. Duke
Power, however, purportedly adopts this rule only for constitutional cases, id., and for
reasons stated in note 48 supra the decision must be regarded as a "sport." In Sanders
Bros., as I have explained elsewhere, see Stewart, supra note 2, at 1730-32, 1742-47,
surrogate standing was granted when an interest protected by statute might otherwise
have gone completely unrepresented. Given the variety of environmental litigating groups
active today, this danger does not seriously exist with respect to environmental interests.
Vining argues that a litigant, once having gained standing, may invoke any public value
in arguing the illegality of government action, subject to the apparent qualification
discussed in note 58 supra. Yet analysis elsewhere in the book suggests that Vining might
well deny the public utility in our hypothetical the right to invoke local environmental
damage when opposing TVA expansion. In chapter eight, see pp. 124-35, Vining develops
the thesis that litigants may speak for public values only when they sincerely hold such
values. The utility company presumably would not meet this requirement. Allowing it to
invoke environmental values would erode rather than advance public respect for such
values by turning them into a nominal rationalization for obstruction based on calcula-
tions of private gain.
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Standing
Vining's account of the breakdown of the common law model of
standing carries conviction because his general claims are articulated
and buttressed by incisive doctrinal and institutional analysis. Such
analysis is largely lacking in those parts of the book which assert that
"public values" is the appropriate basis for standing law. I have ad-
vanced my own view of doctrinal questions in order to suggest that
current standing law could well be explained in terms of an ongoing
private-law model, suitably modified to deal with the problem of collec-
tive goods in a highly regulated economy. The decisional data points
are too few and too smudged either to confirm or refute decisively the
public-values model or the private-dispute-resolving model, although
I believe that the available evidence favors the latter. If Vining is to
make his case, he must establish a methodological link between the
level of doctrine and the level of underlying vision of the legal order,
and explicate that link in sufficient detail to provide additional con-
firmation of the public values model and to indicate more concretely
the form of its future evolution. This is a task of exceptional difficulty,
which has recently attracted the energies of legal scholars in related
fields, much of whose work was published after Vining's manuscript
went to press.63
As I have earlier indicated, the link that Vining advances to explain
the interactive development of doctrine and legal consciousness con-
sists in shifts in judges' perceptions of the moral and social universe.
But the nature of this particular link is obscure and its operation is
unexplained. We are left with two realms of discourse, lawyers' doc-
trine and poetic invocation of the moral life, whose connection remains
nearly as mysterious as Berkeley's clocks. In putting to one side dis-
tributional struggle in economics and politics, the role of institutions,
the manipulation of doctrine by judges and counsel, and contemporane-
ous scholarly efforts in other fields of law, Vining has neglected the
materials with which he might build stronger and more persuasive links
in support of his thesis.
The reader must ultimately be persuaded, if at all, by the suggestive
richness and insight of Vining's writing. Old or newly converted be-
lievers will be buoyed by the call to faith, discounting the need to
address questions of doctrine or institutional responsibility as secondary
63. For examples of recent attempts to relate legal doctrine to underlying intellectual
models, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); M. HORVITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw (1977); Kennedy, supra note 25; cf. Clark, The
Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE
L.J. 90 (1977); Klare, supra note 25.
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to the paramount task of discrediting and destroying the individualist
ethic. Agnostics will be alternately bemused and enticed by Vining's
affectionate and inviting irony. Disbelievers will be discomforted by
his bone-cutting wit.
The evocative and ironic quality of the book and its specialized doc-
trinal subject may at the same time impair its accessibility: the book
has the makings of a connoisseur's piece. But it would be a pity if a
larger audience were not encouraged to read it. The book beckons us
to put aside for a while the baggage of daily contention for a vision
that intimates beneath the weary strife of factional division and doc-
trinal struggle a moral universe that is luxe, calme, even voluptd.
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